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 CHAPTER 8 
 One of the programmatic key quotes of the emergent modern culture of 
refl exivity can be found in the preface to the fi rst edition of Immanuel 
Kant’s  Critique of Pure Reason (1781): ‘Our age is, to a special degree, the 
age of criticism, and to criticism everything must submit.’ (Kant 9) While 
this observation has frequently been acknowledged as ‘the foundation of 
modern philosophy’ (cf. Höffe), its ambiguity rests at the heart of all theo-
retical enterprises which were to follow (including Kant’s own): On the 
one hand, the formula implies a new understanding of theory predicated 
on establishing models, systems, schools of thought, or theories by means 
of questioning the world in order to ascertain unquestionable truth (or 
at least valid and workable descriptions). In this mould, criticism leads to 
construction. On the other hand, the formula acknowledges the poten-
tial inconclusiveness of the persistent questioning that is at the heart of 
the critical method. In this dimension, criticism implies perspective and 
relativity, and theory emerges (in the singular) as an attitude of persistent 
refl ection and (eventually) deconstruction. Modern refl exivity  accordingly 
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manifests itself in two modes: a constructive one ultimately aiming at 
applicability and viability (cf. von Glasersfeld), and an ultimately decon-
structive one which acknowledges the intractable surplus of complexity in 
the world. As these two modes are to a certain extent mutually exclusive, 
they generate an inherently ambiguous understanding of theory which in 
turn generates a wide spectrum of cultural practices, so much so in fact 
that one could speak of distinct cultures of refl exivity in different discur-
sive realms of modern culture. 
 To begin with, this double coding of modern theory clearly indicates 
the schism between the natural sciences and the human sciences as estab-
lished by Wilhelm Dilthey in the 1880s and then later broadened into 
the notion of “the two cultures” by C. P. Snow (1956/1959/1963). As 
late as 2006, Wolfgang Iser introduces the distinction between “hard-
core theory” aimed at prediction and explanation as opposed to “soft 
theory” aimed at mapping and understanding, and while both varieties 
fi gure in the humanities in general and literary and cultural studies in 
particular, the overall trajectory of theory development in literary and 
cultural studies is clearly moving from prescriptive, normative, and dog-
matic theories via descriptive theories towards tentative, exploratory, and 
heuristic theories (cf. Iser 5–9). While various object- and application-
oriented theories (of poetry, drama, the novel; of narrative in general; 
of reader reception; etc.) persist in the discipline, the understanding of 
theory clearly shifted towards the second mode at the end of the twenti-
eth century, insisting that
 Theory is interdisciplinary—discourse with effects outside an original 
discipline. Theory is analytical and speculative—an attempt to work out 
what is involved in what we call sex or language or writing or meaning 
or the subject. Theory is a critique of common sense, of concepts taken 
as natural. Theory is refl exive, thinking about thinking, enquiry into the 
categories we use in making sense of things, in literature and in other 
discursive practices. (Culler 14–15) 
 This development creates tensions between the demands of the science 
system (which are increasingly modelled on the model of the natural sci-
ences, where a discipline is supposed to have an object of study and theories 
 of something) and the role of the humanities as a framework of refl ection, 
including the refl ection on theory itself and refl exivity in general. 
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 One of the problems that emerge here is that due to its conceptual 
detachment from reality, theory in the humanities does not always suc-
cessfully maintain its distinction from discourse and thus loses its ques-
tioning spirit:
 Although the boundaries [between theory and discourse] are somewhat 
contingent, and thus changeable, discourse nevertheless features a defi nite 
view of the world we live in, irrespective of whether it is meant to describe 
this world or is identifi ed with it. Thus discourse is deterministic, whereas 
theory is explorative. Determination versus exploration marks the essential 
difference between the two, and it may well be that humans need these 
contrasting ways of dealing with reality. Discourse draws boundaries, and 
theory lifts them, thereby opening up new territories of anthropological 
signifi cance. It is important to register this distinction because the two are 
sometimes bracketed together as if they were the same thing. (Iser 12) 
 Iser’s example here is the veering of postcolonial theory into a deterministic 
discourse (cf. Iser 172–86). On a more general note, however, one could 
ask whether the totalizing “postmodern” culture of refl exivity prevalent in 
the humanities at the end of the twentieth century did not run a similar risk 
of metamorphosing into discourse in a fi nal consequence of the continuous 
history of (and obsession with) representation that effectively shaped a spe-
cifi cally modern worldview by means of media- induced (print!) abstraction, 
which resulted in a universalism that became ingrained and naturalized in 
modern culture way beyond its philosophical (and theoretical) explications. 
What gets lost in the process is reality: Under modern conditions, the word 
“world” ‘eliminates from the sphere of meaning the whole, actual, “natural” 
world [in] a paradox that grants to whatever necessarily incomplete world 
[…] formed by this naming (or named by this forming) the prestige and 
power of its metaphorical capture of totality’ (Hayot 40). And conversely, 
‘self-refl exivity confi rms the intensity of modernity’s relationship to the uni-
versal, since only through an endless series of self-refl ections can modernity 
include itself in the universal that it aims to describe’ (Hayot 105). 
 What can be done about this? For one, it seems that an insistence on 
culture s of refl exivity can be productive, and this is the point that the 
overall outline of the present volume tries to make: Of course it is nec-
essary to continue the line of refl ection opened up with the triumph of 
capital-T Theory in the 1980s, taking on the mantle of philosophy in its 
renewed take on problems of ontology, epistemology, and truth against 
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the  background of a new acknowledgement of the foundational role of 
representation and mediation. However, this dimension of metatheory 
has to expand its range of refl exivity in order to fully engage with itself. 
Metatheory is by no means the “highest” order of theory somehow incor-
porating all the others, but beyond (and as) philosophical reasoning it is 
also a cultural practice with a more or less pronounced critical agenda, and 
it always articulates itself as text. In order to escape the universalizing bent 
of modern culture, metatheory would have to conceive of itself simul-
taneously in terms of cultural theory, critical theory, and textual theory, 
thus acknowledging its own contingent position with all its privileges and 
limitations: Just as the differentiation of theory into metatheory, cultural 
theory, critical theory, and textual theory provides occasions for mutual 
observation which can add qualitatively to their respective modes of 
refl exivity from the inside, as it were, an awareness of the contingency and 
relativity of cultural practices and positions in the larger context of modern 
culture with their respective contributions to what we know about the 
world can serve the same purpose from the outside. Differentiation, one 
could say, opens up opportunities of comparison and refl exivity in spite of 
the insurmountable immanence of the modern worldview. Only in such a 
design can the ideologies of habitus (see Interlude II) of humanities schol-
ars in general and theorists in particular be addressed with regard to how 
they affect their outlook and practices of interpretation (see Interlude III). 
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